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 Abstract 
This paper reports the findings of a longitudinal study into manufacturing 
performance, lean production principles and buyer supplier relations in the 
Japanese, US and UK automotive industries. A total of 26 first tier component 
makers in the three countries were subject to detailed benchmarking exercises in 
1994 and in 1999-2001. In each exercise data on labour productivity and quality 
performance were obtained, along with a series of quantitative measures 
indicating the extent to which each plant conformed to ‘lean production’ 
principles. 
The results show that the Japanese plants improved their labour productivity by 
around 20 per cent between 1994 and 2001, whilst productivity in the US plants 
remained flat over the same period.  All plants improved their quality 
performance during the period, but the Japanese plants retained their lead with 
an average external defect rate of 81 parts per million (ppm), compared to 111 
ppm for the US plants and 416 ppm in the case of the UK plants. 
Measures of leanness in the supply chain (inventory levels, delivery frequencies 
and so on) should be sensitive to any weakening of the inter-firm relationships 
that have historically characterized the Japanese auto industry. These measures 
showed no evidence of such weakening, although qualitative evidence 
suggested that a polarization of the Japanese auto industry may be occurring 
under the influence of foreign capital, with independent firms such as Toyota 
and Honda (and their suppliers) retaining a stronger ‘Japanese’ character than 
their counterparts who have entered into equity relationships with non-Japanese 
companies. 
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 Lean production and manufacturing performance improvement 
in Japan, the UK and US 1994-2001 
 
Introduction 
During the 1980s and through much of the 1990s the performance 
superiority of Japan’s automotive companies relative to their Western 
counterparts was demonstrated repeatedly with respect to 
manufacturing (Schonberger 1982; Womack et al 1990; Oliver et al 
1994, 1996) and new product development (Clark and Fujimoto 1991; 
Fujimoto 2000).  “The “Machine that Changed the World” by 
Womack, Jones and Roos was published in 1990 and has sold 
hundreds of thousands of copies. This book ascribed Japanese 
manufacturing superiority to “lean production” principles, a distinct 
approach to the management of manufacturing centred largely on the 
Toyota Production System (TPS) the principles of which, it has been 
argued, are applicable to many other business processes as well 
(Womack and Jones 1996). 
 
However, prolonged recession in Japan has taken its toll and Japan is 
no longer regarded as the economic paragon it was assumed to be 10 
to 15 years ago. The reasons for this are not difficult to see. A number 
of Japanese financial institutions have collapsed, amidst widespread 
publicity. Several Japanese auto companies have experienced 
financial problems and have entered into tie-ups with foreign auto 
companies. The most public example of such a tie up was the merger 
between the French car company Renault and Nissan, but many other 
examples abound – Ford has had a substantial stake in Mazda for 
many years, but has increased this recently; GM has a moderate stake 
in Fuji Heavy Industries (Suburu); and Mitsubishi Motors are now 
part of the Daimler-Chrysler Group. Only Honda and Toyota continue 
to go it alone, though both have had, and in Toyota’s case continue to 
have, joint venture activities with non-Japanese partners. Whereas in 
the 1980s and early 1990s much attention in writings on the auto 
industry focused on operational issues (manufacturing and new 
product development) more recently the focus of debate has centred 
more on strategic issues – acquisition and merger, systems supply, 
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 modularity, e-procurement and exchanges and so on. Also, with the 
efficacy of the whole Japanese system called into question (Porter et 
al 2000), interest in Japanese firms as an example of a superior 
business model, to be emulated by the rest of the world, has declined.  
Consequently, performance comparisons between Japanese firms and 
their Western counterparts attract less attention than they once did. 
This is in many ways unfortunate. Although the focus of attention on 
Japan in the 1980s and 1990s may have been unduly operational, to 
the neglect of strategic issues, operational issues are still important 
and Japan still has lessons for the rest of the world. Furthermore, 
Japan’s prowess for continuous improvement has been one of the 
features that delivered the manufacturing performance superiority so 
graphically illustrated by the studies of the 1980s and 1990s; has this 
been sustained in Japan, and to what effect? Japan’s inter firm 
networks, once seen as a crucial source of Japan’s competitive 
advantage, have been put under strain by prolonged recession and the 
influx of foreign capital. How are these faring in today’s 
environment? Commentators such as Williams et al (1994) have 
argued that the success of Japan’s auto industry, and Japan’s 
particular social arrangements of production, were a function of an 
unusual set of historical circumstances. When long term growth came 
to an end, Williams et al predicted, Japan’s car companies would start 
to behave in ways indistinguishable from their Western counterparts. 
Is this occurring? 
 
The purpose of this paper is to address such issues via an analysis of 
relative levels of performance – and rates of improvement – amongst 
first tier automotive component manufacturers in Japan, the UK and 
the US. The study on which the paper is based is unusual in that 
detailed benchmarks of practice and performance were taken from a 
panel of plants in the three countries in 1994 and again in the period 
1999-2001 when the measurement exercise was repeated with the 
same plants. This provides a rare glimpse of change over time at an 
unusually high level of detail.  
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 Companies and Methods 
As Table 1 shows, data were collected from 35 plants in the three 
countries in 1994 and from 29 plants in 1999-2001, of which 26 
plants were common to both studies. The 1994 study also covered an 
additional 36 plants in France, Germany, Italy, Mexico and Spain, but 
these have been excluded from the analysis as we have no data on 
these plants for 1999-2001. 
 
The data collection process involved an initial visit to each plant by 
members of the research team.  At this visit the research team 
introduced the project, carried out an inspection of the plant and 
briefed the plant management on how to complete the questionnaire.  
The questionnaire was then left with the plant for a period of four to 
six weeks.  This was a substantial document, with approximately 
1,000 data fields, and typically took several days of management time 
to complete.  The research team then made a second visit to each 
plant and reviewed the completed questionnaire with the plant 
management, a process which could take anything up to one day.  
Data collection during 1999-2001 followed exactly the same process. 
In most cases, staff turnover in the plants meant that the research team 
were dealing with a different set of respondents to those involved in 
the 1994 study. 
 
The questionnaire covered seven main areas: plant performance; plant 
characteristics; process control; work organization; problem solving 
and improvement; relations with suppliers; and relations with 
customers.  The main purpose of the questionnaire was to yield data 
that would permit systematic comparisons of performance between 
the plants in each product area, and profile the management practices 
of each plant to ascertain the extent to which lean production 
principles were in use.  The questionnaire was constructed around the 
model of lean production presented in Figure 1. 
 
Plant performance was measured by physical productivity, in terms of 
units per labour hour.  This was calculated by taking the annual units 
of output of each facility and dividing it by the annual hours of labour 
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 input.  Adjustments were made for vertical integration, for the length 
of the working day, for overtime, absenteeism, and product 
complexity (for exhaust plants only).  Quality was measured as 
defective units in parts per million (ppm) as reported to the plants by 
their customers (the car makers) over the same twelve-month period.  
The measures of management practice represented quantitative 
indicators of the use of lean production principles.  The `leanness' of 
factory operations was measured by counting the hours of inventory 
of specific parts at various stages along the production process.   
Continuous improvement activities were measured by asking about 
the presence or absence of suggestion schemes, the number of 
suggestions per employee and the use, membership, and activity rates 
of problem-solving groups such as quality circles.  A similar approach 
was applied along the supply chain, on both the customer and supplier 
sides.  Thus, data were gathered on the inventories of raw materials 
and finished goods, on delivery frequencies both by suppliers and to 
customers, on information exchange, joint problem solving activities 
between firms and so on. 
 
Results 
The results are presented under the following headings: 
1. Manufacturing performance 
2. Context – volumes, headcount, product variety 
3. Problem solving and improvement 
4. Buyer-supplier relations. 
 
Manufacturing Performance 
The first question that we set out to address was the relative 
productivity of plants in the three countries. Womack, et al (1990) 
claimed a 2:1 gap between Japanese vehicle assembly plants and their 
Western counterparts. Previous studies in the auto components sector 
(Oliver et al 1994, 1996) showed smaller gaps than this, although 
these were still substantial and virtually always in favour of the 
Japanese plants. 
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 Table 2 demonstrates that the Japanese plants continue to outperform 
both the US and British plants in terms of labour productivity 
(minutes per unit). The Japanese seat plants are twice as productive as 
their US counterparts. The exhaust and brake plants show seven per 
cent and 15 per cent performance differentials respectively in favour 
of the Japanese over US plants. Overall, the British plants show an 
even greater productivity shortfall vis a vis the Japanese. 
 
When the 2001 figures are compared to the 1994 performance figures 
for the same plants, a surprising picture emerges.  The Japanese plants 
average an increase in labour productivity of 20 per cent, whereas 
labour productivity in the US plants has remained more or less static, 
and the British plants actually show a decline of 13 per cent. The net 
impact of this is a widening of the productivity gap between the 
Japanese plants and the US and British plants between 1994 and 
2001.  
 
The pattern of performance differentials is repeated with respect to 
defect rates. The Japanese plants average an external defect rate of 81 
parts per million (ppm), some 25-30 per cent lower than the US plants 
and one fifth of the rate of the British plants. Compared to 1994 levels 
of quality, plants in all three countries show big improvements, in 
particular the British plants, though in the British case this was from a 
very high 1994 baseline of approximately 1,700 ppm. In 1994, US 
and Japanese levels of defects were similar; six years later there are 
signs that the Japanese may be opening up the gap again. 
 
Context 
What explains the apparent declines in labour productivity on the part 
of the UK and US plants? Declines in production volumes that have 
not been matched with a corresponding adjustment in staffing levels 
are an obvious explanation, but on average production volumes have 
risen, indicating that these plants are winners in terms of pressures for 
consolidation of production in the auto industry. In absolute terms 
production volumes in the Japanese and US plants were broadly 
comparable, and roughly double those of the UK plants. However, it 
 5
 is striking that the expansion of output of the Japanese plants between 
1994 and 2001 (+33%) has been achieved with only a modest increase 
to headcount, whereas the UK and US plants not only show 
substantial increases in volumes but also show substantial increases in 
numbers of employees. It should be noted that differences in vertical 
integration, product complexity, overtime, absence and non-working 
time all mediate in the relationship between headcount, volumes and 
labour productivity, and that the changes in labour productivity are 
not a straight function of changes to headcount and production 
volumes.  
 
Product proliferation, as indicated by increased numbers of live part 
numbers, could be one explanation of static or depressed labour 
productivity, with its implications of shorter production runs, more set 
ups and associated logistics headaches. Fujimoto (2000) has reported 
efforts to increase the use of common parts across different vehicle 
platforms in Japan, and argues that this may be increasing the length 
of time spent in the planning stages of the product development cycle. 
The measure of product variety in this study was the number of live 
part numbers. Changes on this measure may be driven by strategies 
on the part of the component makers such as diversification of their 
customer bases, as well as increases in product variety on the part of 
the car makers that they already serve.  
 
The Japanese plants show the greatest product variety, by a 
substantial margin – more than double the level of the UK and six 
times that of the US plants. As already demonstrated, production 
volumes in Japan and the US are broadly comparable, suggesting 
radically different volume/variety mixes in the two countries. 
Moreover, when the 1994 and 2001 figures are compared it is clear 
that the US plants are on a very different trajectory to the Japanese 
and UK plants, managing to reduce product variety by over 50 per 
cent whilst at the same time increasing volumes by about the same 
amount. This suggests progress with parts standardization and 
consolidation of production that is as yet absent in Japan or the UK. 
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 Capacity utilization was also explored as a driver of changes in labour 
productivity. The US showed a slight drop in capacity utilization, and 
Japan and the UK showed increases in capacity utilization. This 
suggests that some of the boost to Japanese productivity is due to a 
better matching of output to capacity between 1994 and 2001. 
However, capacity utilization provides no clue as to why productivity 
of the UK plants has fallen. 
 
Plants in all three countries show substantial falls in external defect 
rates between 1994 and 2001. However, there are differences in the 
patterns of reasons behind these defect rates, as Table 4 illustrates. 
 
Amongst the Japanese plants, human errors in manufacturing stand 
out as the single most common cause of defects, in contrast to the UK 
and US where technical issues (for example machine problems) are 
the most frequent explanation of defects.  Suppliers also stand out as a 
particular source of quality problems in the US, consistent with the 
figures on defect rates of parts coming in from second tier suppliers, 
shown in Table 6.  In the 1994 study the US second tier performed 
poorly relative to the first tier and this pattern does not seem to have 
been addressed in the interim. 
 
During the plant inspections in Japan, the most visible manifestations 
of quality improvement efforts were techniques and devices to reduce 
human errors – poke yoke. For example, since 1994 several plants had 
introduced devices such as infra-red sensors across the openings of 
line side bins that held small components such as fasteners, washers 
and other fittings. These sensors detected whether an operator had put 
his or her hand in the bin to pick up a fitting, and unless this had 
occurred prevented the work piece moving on to the next workstation. 
This reduced the probability of components being missed out of the 
assembly process. One seat plant had taken this a stage further by 
fitting covers to component bins – these covers were opened 
automatically with the arrival of the work piece. However, a bar code 
on the work piece controlled which covers were opened, thereby 
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 eliminating the possibility of incorrect components being fitted to the 
work piece. 
 
Given such innovations, it is somewhat surprising to see ‘human 
error’ appearing as the most significant cause of defects in the 
Japanese plants; this may be a testament to the progress that has 
already occurred in other areas, such as machine and supplier 
reliability. 
 
Problem Solving and Improvement 
The literature has made much of the bottom-up problem solving 
found in Japanese factories. This is manifested through employee 
suggestion schemes, in problem solving groups such as quality 
circles, and most generally under the generic banner of ‘kaizen’ 
activities.  
 
Consistent with the patterns found in the 1994 study, the Japanese 
plants continue to show most activity on our measures of kaizen 
activity, as shown in Table 5. Japanese plants show the highest 
participation of production operators in problem-solving groups and 
the highest number of suggestions per head. Both US and UK plants 
show substantial increases in suggestions per employee, but this is 
from a relatively low base in 1994 and so the differential between the 
US and UK plants and the Japanese plants remains substantial. There 
was little change in suggestions per head in Japan over the period, 
suggesting a ‘topping out’ at around 25 suggestions per employee per 
year. In interviews, we explored the question of whether incremental 
process improvement could continue to yield the saving necessary to 
meet the cost reduction targets imposed by the car makers. Most 
respondents felt that incremental process improvements of themselves 
could not continue over long periods to deliver the required cost 
reductions and looked to value analysis and value engineering 
(VA/VE) techniques, and design-led cost reductions to drive out cost.  
One respondent commented that incremental process improvement 
over prolonged periods was akin to “trying to squeeze water from a 
dry towel”. 
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 Buyer-Supplier Relations 
The relatively close relations between buyers and suppliers in the 
Japanese auto-industry, manifested by the keiretsu system, have been 
one of the most noted features of the Japanese system, and it has been 
argued, provide a major support to both the manufacturing and 
product development operations of the Japanese car companies by 
creating long term, high trust relations that facilitate co-operative 
behaviour such as joint cost reduction activities and problem solving 
and permit the tight coordination for JIT principles to work along the 
supply chain (Helper and Sako 1995; Lamming 1993; Macduffie and 
Helper 1997; Nishiguchi 1994; Nishiguchi and Beadet 1998; Sako 
1992).  The prolonged recession in Japan may be expected to affect 
some of these characteristics.  A contraction in the market is likely to 
place long term collaborative relationships between buyers and 
suppliers under stress, as the game moves from being win-win to win-
lose. There are certainly some signs that this is occurring. For 
example, in late 1999 Nissan announced that it was reducing its 
number of suppliers from 1,145 to less than 600 by 2002, selling its 
shares in all but four of its affiliate companies, and adopting Western-
style competitive bidding for new contracts amongst its suppliers. 
Nissan parts suppliers reacted angrily to this: 
 
“Nissan officials are shirking their responsibility for 
having not been able to make cars that sell. Instead they 
are blaming us suppliers”. 
 
“We shall be forced to stop purchasing automobiles from a 
company that coldly cuts us off” (Daily Yomiuri, 28 
January 2000). 
 
Ironically, the mentality of interdependence between companies, 
banks and suppliers, which has been seen as a strength of the Japanese 
business system, is now regarded as part of the problem, at least by 
Nissan’s French partners. This had led some observers to argue that 
the traditional Japanese business system is breaking down and 
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 converging towards a more “Western” (usually conceived of as 
market-based) model of buyer-supplier relations. 
 
If this interpretation is correct, then the quantitative indicators of the 
closeness of buyer-supplier relations in Japan should exhibit signs of 
a loosening of relations.  These figures are shown in Tables 6 and 7 
(for links between the plants in the study and their suppliers) and 
Tables 8 and 9 (for links to car makers).   
 
In 1994, the Japanese plants had approximately double the number of 
suppliers of their US and UK counterparts. Seven years later the 
number of Japanese suppliers had increased by 11 per cent (mainly 
due to increases in product variety). US plants showed much larger 
increases in the number of second tier suppliers (50 per cent plus) 
which is surprising given the US rationalization of product ranges 
noted previously.  One possible explanation is that the continuing 
poor performance of the second tier in the US has forced the first tier 
extend their supplier bases in the search for more competent suppliers.  
This does not appear to have proved successful given the quality 
performance figures in Table 6. 
 
On the two main indicators of supplier performance, on-time delivery 
and defect rates of incoming parts, Japanese plants continue to 
outperform UK and US plants. Since 1994 the latter show some 
improvement in terms of on-time delivery but virtually no change in 
terms of defect rates, accounting for the relatively high incidence of 
reports of 2nd tier supplier-induced defects in the quality performance 
of the 1st tier plants. 
 
The measures of inventories and delivery frequencies, which we use 
to show the closeness of relations between the focal plants in the 
study and their suppliers (at least in a logistical sense) continue to 
show much tighter links between 1st and 2nd suppliers in Japan than in 
the US or UK. There is a 1:5 differential between Japanese and US 
plants and a 1:9 differential between Japan and the UK in terms of 
inventory levels.  Japan and the US both show comparable falls in 
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 inventory levels over the seven year period, in the order of 25 per 
cent. 
 
Thus, there is little evidence of a loosening of relationships at the 2nd 
tier/1st tier interface in Japan during the period covered by the study. 
It may of course be that the logistics-based indicators of closeness are 
not sensitive to the changing commercial arrangements (such as the 
awarding of contracts on the basis of price-based competition) that are 
unfolding around them. Alternatively, it may be that any such changes 
are more marked at the car maker/1st tier supplier interface where the 
impact of influences such as foreign capital are most evident.  The 
results pertinent to this are shown in Tables 8 and 9. 
 
The data on the car maker/1st tier interface show a similar pattern to 
that already observed at the 1st tier/2nd tier interface. Japanese plants 
show much better performance in terms of on time delivery (by a 
factor of over 40), have far lower inventories and more frequent 
deliveries compared to the UK and US plants. All these measures 
indicate a much tighter coupling between car-makers and suppliers in 
Japan than is found in the other two countries. Moreover, it can be 
seen from Table 9 that the Japanese plants show more improvement 
on these measures between 1994 and 2001. Of the three countries, the 
Japanese plants show the least change in terms of numbers of car 
makers that they serve, again indicative of stability and continuity, 
rather than change and revolution, in Japanese buyer-supplier 
networks. 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
What do these patterns of change in Japan, the UK and US 
demonstrate? First, they show that, at least as far as these auto 
component plants are concerned, Japan has not lost its edge over the 
US and UK in terms of manufacturing performance. The Japanese 
plants have continued to make improvements in terms of labour 
efficiency and still lead their US and especially their UK counterparts, 
by a significant margin. Labour productivity in the US and UK plants 
has been more or less static (and actually shows a decline in the case 
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 of the UK). Although on average production volumes in the plants in 
all three countries have risen, Japan has managed this with a much 
smaller increase in headcount than either the US or UK plants, and 
without a major rationalization of product ranges. The US plants have 
made considerable progress in rationalizing their product ranges.  
 
Plants in all three countries have made significant progress in 
reducing the proportion of defective products that reach their 
customers (that is, the car makers, in the case of this study). Japan 
continues to lead the US in quality performance by a margin of 
around 30 per cent, whilst the UK trails a distant third. Defects in 
incoming parts are a particular problem in the US, suggesting that the 
manufacturing reform that has been occurring amongst the car makers 
and first tier suppliers has still to penetrate the second and third tiers. 
 
The continuing poor performance of US second tier suppliers is 
striking.  In 1994 we noted that US first tier suppliers were struggling 
to cope with poor quality and delivery performance from their second 
tier suppliers, and that their role as a quality ‘filter’ added 
considerable strain and cost.  These findings were acknowledged and 
confirmed by the industry at the time but the subsequent period has 
seen little improvement.  One impediment to improvement in 
suppliers’ performance appears to be that purchasing decisions are 
taken primarily on a cost basis, by headquarters functions unfamiliar 
with the operational and logistics requirements of their own plants.  
Given the sustained, and in some areas increasing, performance 
advantage of the Japanese plants, it is precisely in areas such as these 
that renewed interest should be taken.  
 
The measures relevant to the closeness of buyer supplier relations 
largely present a picture of continuity, rather than change, in Japan. 
The tight logistics symptomatic of close social relations between 
buyers and suppliers have if anything become tighter over the last 
seven years. Of course it may be that changes in the commercial 
relations between firms do not affect such operational details, though 
this would run counter to what has been the accepted wisdom through 
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 much of the 1980s and 1990s, namely that it is the very existence of 
tight social relations that permits and facilitates operational 
excellence.  An alternative explanation is that changes in social 
relations are occurring, but that the lag inherent in any such changes is 
obscuring this.  
 
The results of this study also point to an apparent paradox. The 
Japanese plants clearly perform very well operationally, but a more 
macro economic analysis does not present the same picture of 
success.  The largest component firms in the world are predominantly 
US and European firms – only one or Japanese firms figure in the top 
ten. Similarly, many Japanese firms have been experiencing financial 
problems of one sort or another and recourse to foreign capital has 
been one response to this. Detailed treatment of this issue is beyond 
the remit of this paper, but one interpretation of this is that Japanese 
suppliers are suffering due to the structural features of the Japanese 
auto industry – specifically a relatively large number of car and 
associated component makers, with relatively high dependency 
relations between car makers and their main component suppliers. 
This structure facilitates cooperation between car makers and 
suppliers, but means that the risks faced by the component makers are 
relatively concentrated. In the event of a prolonged recession, as 
Japan has faced, such a structure may more rapidly lead to financial 
problems than one in which component makers can spread their risks 
across a wider base of car makers, and possibly car-producing 
regions. In this respect, the very conditions that encourage operational 
excellence through greater intimacy between buyers and suppliers 
may work against the spreading of risk – and vice versa. 
 
This said, the economic problems experienced by Japan at a 
macroeconomic level should not distract from the continuing lessons 
that may be gleaned from operational assessments of Japanese 
manufacturers. In difficult circumstances, Japanese plants have 
continued to improve their operational performance.  The concept of 
continuous improvement is one of the most significant components of 
the Japanese model of manufacturing; the evidence reported here 
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 suggests that this concept remains an enduring feature of Japanese 
manufacturers and it remains an area where Western manufacturers 
may have much to learn. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
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 TABLE 1: JAPANESE, UK AND US PLANTS (1994 and 1999-
2001) 
 
 1994 1999-2001 Number 
Common to 
Both Studies 
Japan   9 10   8 
UK 12   9   9 
US 14 10   9 
Total 35 29 26 
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 FIGURE 1: THE LEAN PRODUCTION MODEL 
 
 Inside the Factory Along the Supply 
Chain 
Flow JIT, low inventories of 
WIP, ‘pull’ systems of 
production control, 
simple work flow, 
team based work 
organization, visual 
control 
JIT deliveries, low 
inventories of 
incoming parts and 
finished goods 
Error Prevention High process control, 
work standardization, 
poke yoke, design for 
manufacture 
Joint planning, design 
and development, high 
visibility of processes 
along the supply chain, 
schedule stability, staff 
exchanges 
Improvement Problem solving and 
continuous 
improvement groups, 
suggestion schemes  
Joint problem solving 
and cost reduction, 
supplier associations 
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 TABLE 2: PRODUCTIVITY, QUALITY AND CHANGE OVER 
TIME 1994-2001 
 Japan UK US 
Minutes of direct labour to 
produce a unit, 2001: 
  Seat plants 
  Exhaust plants 
  Brake plants 
 
 
45.5 
  7.5 
  5.5 
 
 
83.3 
  9.8 
13.8 
 
 
90.1 
  8.1 
  6.5 
Average change in labour 
productivity 1994-2001 
+20% -13% -2% 
External defect rates (ppm, 
2001) 
81 416 111 
Change in defect rate 1994-
2001 
-58% -75% -35% 
 
 
TABLE 3: CONTEXT AND CHANGE OVER TIME 
 Japan UK US 
Headcount (direct and indirect) 275  240  306 
Product variety (excluding 
exhausts)1 
357  145    63 
Change in production volumes 
since 1994 
+33% +62% +53% 
Change in headcount since 
1994 
+11% +49% +55% 
Change in product variety since 
1994 
+12% +45% -52% 
 
1 Due to special circumstances (high aftermarket requirements, 
options of shipping part-products this measure is prone to unreliability 
for exhaust plants and has therefore been excluded) 
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 TABLE 4: SOURCES OF DEFECTS 
 Japan UK US 
Design issues   7.5% 10.3%   7.4% 
Suppliers   8.0% 15.7% 25.0% 
Manufacturing - 
technical issues 
  7.9% 36.9% 41.9% 
Manufacturing – human 
issues 
68.8% 33.5% 21.9% 
Other   7.8%   3.6%   3.8% 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5: PROBLEM SOLVING AND IMPROVEMENT 
 Japan UK US 
% of operators 
involved in problem 
solving groups 
88.1% 70.0% 52.0% 
Suggestions per head  24.5 1.9 4.0 
Annual target per 
operator 
19.3 2.0 13.3 
% of suggestions 
from production 
operators 
69.0% 87.4% 42.3% 
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 TABLE 6: SUPPLIER RELATIONS, 2001 
 Japan UK US 
Number of suppliers 78  32  56  
Incoming defect rate (ppm) 463  3,861  7,752  
% of late deliveries from 
suppliers 
3.5% 4.4% 12.3% 
Hours of incoming parts 10.6  93.8  55.4  
Frequency of delivery from 
suppliers (every x hours) 
6.1 41.0  25.5 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 7: INDICATORS OF CHANGE OVER TIME IN 1ST 
TIER/2ND TIER RELATIONS 
 Japan UK US 
Number of suppliers +11% +7% +51% 
Hours of incoming 
parts 
-26% -10% -25% 
Frequency of 
deliveries from 
suppliers  
+8% -4% +53% 
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 TABLE 8: CUSTOMER RELATIONS, 2001 
 Japan UK US 
Number of customers  3.0 2.4 2.3 
% of late deliveries to 
customers 
0.1% 4.8% 4.2% 
Finished goods inventory 
(hours) 
2.4 69.6  30.0 
Frequency of delivery to 
customers (every x hours) 
4.1  15.5 10.2 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 9: INDICATORS OF CHANGE OVER TIME IN 1ST 
TIER/CAR MAKER RELATIONS 
 Japan UK US 
Number of 
customers 
+3% +42% +13% 
Hours of finished 
goods 
-79% -1% +18% 
Frequency of 
delivery  
+20% -30% +12% 
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